Security Economics in the European Context: Implications of the EUSECON Project by Michael Brzoska et al.
Economics of Security Working Paper Series 
























































Michael Brzoska, Raphael Bossong, Eric van Um 
Security Economics in the European 







Economics of Security Working Paper 58
This publication is an output of EUSECON, a research project supported by the European 
Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme. Economics of Security Working Paper Series 

































Correct citation: Brzoska, M. et al. (2011). “Security economics in the European context – 
implications of the EUSECON project”. Economics of Security Working Paper 58, Berlin: 
Economics of Security. 
 
 
First published in 2011 
 





For further information, please contact: 
 
Economics of Security, c/o Department of Development and Security, DIW Berlin – German 
Institute for Economic Research, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany. 
 
Tel: +49 (0)30 89 789-277 
 
Email: eusecon@diw.de  
 
Website: www.economics-of-security.eu 1 






2, Eric van Um
2 
 
This paper presents key aspects and policy implications of a multi-annual research project on economic analyses 
of European security issues (EUSECON), with an emphasis on intentional threats of organised crime, piracy and 
terrorism. The first part argues that rational models can provide significant insights on the emergence and 
current  patterns  of  terrorism  and  piracy.  These  findings  could  lead  to  new  priorities  or  to  more  nuanced 
interventions in response to these threats. The second part focuses on the direct and indirect costs of both 
terrorism  and  organised  crime.  EUSECON  provided  new  data  about  the  scope of  related  illegal  economic 
activities and explored the sensitivity of markets, societies and polities in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. It 
emerges that political actors are at greatest risk of over-responding, whereas mature economies display a high 
degree of resilience. Finally, the third part discusses economic approaches to policy evaluation. EUSECON 
clarified the benefits of transnational security cooperation, but also highlights the difficulties of rigorous cost-
effectiveness  and  cost-benefit  calculations.  Therefore,  a  more  evidence-based  approach  to  security  policy-
making, which is increasingly touted by EU decision-makers, remains elusive. In conclusion, European security 
policy needs further scrutiny from an economic perspective, in order to answer the increasing complexity of 




1  Introduction 
 
Economists have endeavoured to apply economic instruments and methods to a wide variety 
of social and political problems. While some research traditions, such as on collective action 
and defence expenditure reach back several decades, the literature on terrorism has grown 
exponentially since the events of September 11. In this context EUSECON took stock of, and 
advanced  research  on  security  economics  (Brück  et  al.,  2008;  Schneider  et  al.,  2011a; 
Schneider et al., 2011b). In line with the breadth and scope of research activities, Brück et al. 
(2008:  8)  broadly  define  the  field  as  such:  “Security  economics  is  understood  as  those 
activities  affected  by,  preventing,  and  mitigating  insecurity  including  terrorism,  in  the 
economy”.  
 
The  EUSECON  project  focused  specifically  on  the  European  context,  where  there  is  a 
growing demand for rigorous and scientific analysis of security issues. Heller (2009) shows 
how notions of security have undergone dynamic change within the EU. While in the late 
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1990s most attention was paid to organised crime, 9/11 catapulted terrorism to the top of the 
political  agenda.  Heller  also  shows  how  EU  policy  makers  have  developed  increasingly 
sophisticated and interrelated security notions, whereby terrorism and organised crime are 
seen as networked threats.  
 
The EUSECON project broadly followed this emphasis, but also touched on other forms of 
security threats. For instance, research by Brück et al. (2008) takes the wider costs of violent 
conflicts in non European settings into account, while other contributions (Ramseger et al., 
2009)  have  focused  on  the  possible  effects  of  disasters  caused  by  weapons  of  mass 
destruction. Most recently, the resurgent concern with piracy added to the mix of transnational 
threats. This has also been swiftly reflected in EUSECON research (De Groot and Shortland, 
2010; de Groot et al., 2011; Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). 
 
Against this background, three reasons motivate the application of economic approaches and 
methods  to  European  security policy.  First,  economic  methods  and  approaches  have  long 
played a role in the explanation of organised crime. Carrying the analysis of rational action 
into other security areas such as terrorism may improve measures to counter such threats. 
Second,  organised  crime,  terrorism  and  disasters  cause  economic  and  social  damage  that 
needs  to be  assessed.  Improved  risk  assessments  as well  as better pricing  and  costing  of 
possible damages should inform public threat communication and orientate decision makers’ 
priorities. Third, the rapid growth of security measures after 9/11 and the current climate of 
financial austerity raise the question which kind of security policies are effective and efficient. 
Economic  policy  analysis  could  help  in  answering  these  concerns  and  lead  to  more 
sustainable security policies.  
 
The EUSECON project has contributed in all three respects. Research has covered the causes 
and drivers of violence but also the economic and political impact of terrorism and organised 
crime.  Research  has  also  addressed policy  oriented issues  and  evaluated  existing  security 
policies. A structured overview of the EUSECON research is provided in the Annex (Fig. 3). 
 
The present paper illustrates how the EUSECON project contributed to a better understanding 
of the drivers of insecurity and provided new insights with regard to costs and benefits of 
security policies. First, research within EUSECON corroborates that economic incentives and 
rational models can usefully be applied to threats beyond organised crime. For instance, new 3 
insights into the rational incentives of pirates should affect policy makers' perceptions about 
the risks and benefits of addressing state failure. 
 
Second, the project provided a clearer picture of the likely impact of terrorism and other 
serious forms of crime, even if significant limitations with regard to data and indirect costs 
continue  to  apply.  It  is  shown  that  terrorism  and  serious  crime  have  significant  negative 
effects that reach beyond the immediate impact of attacks or criminal acts, but that mature 
European economies are also surprisingly resistant or recover quickly. In contrast, political 
systems are more vulnerable to over invest in long term security measures in the immediate 
aftermath of attacks. Politicians should aim to resist these dynamics and take confidence in 
the resilience of society. 
 
Third, models of rational action can illuminate a number of collective action problems and the 
benefits of transnational security cooperation. This underlines the possible added value of EU 
security  policy making.  However,  rigorous  cost effectiveness  and  cost benefit  analyses  of 
counter terrorism and security policies either face high methodological obstacles or mostly 
point towards limited utility and high social, economic or political costs. A decade after 9/11, 
security  economics  thus  supports  more  critical  or  sceptical  assessments  of  the  long term 
benefits of many security measures.  
 
 
2  The insights and methods of threat analysis [in and for Europe] 
 
This section discusses how economic approaches can shed new light on different security 
threats. It argues for a more consistent treatment of these threats on the basis of rational actor 
models,  which  contrasts  with  political  discourses  on  “mad”  terrorists.  Furthermore,  it  is 
shown that structural conditions of development and governance can be systematically related 
to patterns of terrorism and piracy. These relationships as well as the rational calculations of 
threatening actors are complex and non linear, however.  
 
2.1  Causes of violence: terrorism and crime reconsidered  
In order to effectively fight (the emergence of) terrorism and other forms of serious crime, 
more needs to be known about the underlying causes and motives that drive people to turn to 
violence. On the structural level, a large number of factors have been cited as possible causes, 4 
including  but  not  limited  to  the  political  system  (democratic  or  autocratic  regime), 
demographics, cultural and economic factors. In the European context, economic deprivation 
has long been cited as one of the perceived key factors that drive terrorism, deviance and 
political violence. More recent research on terrorism then cast doubt on this view, as many 
terrorists  were  not  found  to  be  poor  or  uneducated.  As  a  result,  it  has  been  argued  that 
political repression is the most significant determinant for terrorist violence. 
 
Yet overall, the rapidly growing literature on the causes of terrorism has remained highly 
ambivalent  and  inconclusive  (Meierrieks  and  Krieger,  2009).  EUSECON  advanced  this 
important debate on the factors that are conducive to terrorism. To start with, Drakos (2009a) 
makes  clear  that  we  actually  know  very  little  both  about  terrorist  incidents  and  terrorist 
groups.  Existing  datasets  have  a  different  understanding  of  terrorism  which  limits 
comparability. With respect to terrorist groups, we have only very limited information about 
demographics,  linkages,  financing  and  recruitment  of  these.  Neither  have  we  very  well 
understood  the  operating  methods  of  terrorists  so  far.  The  great  demand  that  security 
economics has generated for more and better data has so far not sufficiently been met.  
 
Despite these limitations Freytag et al. (2010a) provide substantive evidence that social and 
economic conditions in the country of origin of terrorist attacks are positively correlated with 
the  occurrence  of  terrorism.  The  distinction  of  countries  of  origin  is  important,  as 
transnational  terrorists  frequently  attack  prosperous  and  liberal  Western  societies.  This 
relationship seems to be non linear, however, as improving economic performance is found to 
encourage terror in poor countries and to reduce terror in richer countries. A threshold exists 
with  respect  to  macroeconomic  performance  that  determines  whether  economic  growth 
reduces  or  increases  terror.  Similarly,  Freytag  et al.  (2010b)  report  that  terrorist  violence 
seems to be dependent upon socio economic strength and stability of a political system. 
 
From a more conceptual perspective, Murshed (2009a, 2009b; Murshed and Pavan, 2009) 
argues that Muslims in Europe, victim to real and perceived discrimination adopt a sense of 
collective identity and turn to their in groups as a source of identification. For individuals, it 
would then not only be the own economic and political situation but the (endangered) well 
being of their group they identify with that shapes their behaviour and possibly makes them 
turn to violence. Murshed et al. (ibid.) maintain that such a sense of discrimination is deeply 
embedded among European Muslims, both with regard to their current political and economic 5 
position  in  different  European  countries  as  well  as  with  regard  to  their  wider  social  and 
historical identity. In short, European Muslims are found to be systematically poorer, to suffer 
from greater unemployment and to lack representation in public life. At the same time, anti 
immigrant and anti Muslim parties in Denmark, the Netherlands, and elsewhere have been on 
the rise, which accentuated the potential for violence.  
 
Other  political  conditions  remain  at  least  as  important  as  real  or  imagined  patterns  of 
discrimination.  Malečková  and  Stanišić  (2010)  use  data  on  public  opinion  from  the  Pew 
Global Attitudes Project
3 and study 16 countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia with a 
large Muslim population. The study tests for a link between public opinion and patterns of 
terrorism. For that purpose, the study looks at two dimensions: the public opinion of regional 
powers
4  and  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  suicide  terrorism.  The  results  confirm  the 
relevance of public opinion for terrorism, although acceptance of suicide terrorism and the 
opinion of a regional power vary widely among the countries considered. In countries where 
suicide bombings were justified by wide parts of the population, terrorist levels were higher. 
Similarly, in countries where an unfavourable opinion was prevalent towards the regional 
power, high levels of terrorist attacks from the source country against the target country took 
place.  
 
As a policy recommendation, one needs to underline the role of the welfare state when it 
comes to attenuating social and economic discrimination and fostering peaceful attitudes of 
Muslim minorities. Conversely, security policies may backfire, if they harden the sense of 
discrimination of minorities.
5 Van Um (2009) similarly argues that deterrence is likely to fail 
with regard to militants that have joined a group to develop and intensify social linkages. 
Finally, when turning to third states that either suffer from terrorism, or “send” terrorism to 
Europe,  one  should  focus  on  those  cases  where  regional powers  are  disliked  and  suicide 
terrorism is accepted. 
 
EUSECON has also conducted research on the drivers of piracy and (to a lesser degree) in the 
field of organised crime. Results are equally country or region specific and show that the 
                                                 
3   The  Pew  Global  Attitudes  Project,  Rising  Environmental  Concern  in  47  –  Nation  Survey,  Global 
Unease with Major World Powers. www.pewglobal.org/datasets/. 
4   These include the United States, the Russian Federation, Iran, India, the European Union, China, Egypt, 
Japan and Saudi Arabia. 
5   Such  as  random  “stop and search”  operations  that  mainly  target  non white  citizens  or  residents 
(Bowling and Phillips, 2007). 6 
emergence of piracy seems to be dependent on differing levels of governance. Shortland and 
de Groot (2010) find that the most “serious” forms of piracy occur under specific “mid level” 
conditions of governance, that is when pirates can draw on functioning markets and basic 
security, but exploit opportunities for illegal activities and corruption.
6 This argument also 
applies  to  seemingly  countervailing  cases  such  as  Somalia,  as  “failed  states”  can  readily 
incorporate areas or pockets of relative stability that are more conducive to sustained and 
accumulative  criminal  activities.
7  The  (non linear)  relationship  between  key 
economic/political  indicators  and  levels  of  violence  which  was  established  in  EUSECON 
research is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1    Relationship of economic and governance indicators and levels of violence 
 
Source: Relationship between economic growth and terrorism as indicated by Freytag et al. 
(2010a). Relationship between quality of governance and piracy as indicated by De Groot and 
Shortland (2010). 
 
Priorities in combating piracy should therefore be placed on those states that already are close 
to that turning point rather than on complete (state) failures. The fight against corruption is of 
particular  importance  in  this  respect,  as  it  is  a  critical  instrument  of  criminals  to  take 
                                                 
6  The authors present an innovation with regard to the use of data. Noting that official crime reports are 
unavailable or notoriously unreliable for the weakest and must vulnerable states, they resort to event data that is 
directly collected by affected “victims” of piracy for the international maritime bureau. This much more neutral 
and  complete  data  on  one  form  of  serious  or  organised  crime  allows  more  accurate  testing  of  theoretical 
propositions than state generated data.  
7  A similar argument about necessary pockets of orders could be made for terrorist “safe havens”, such as 
the tribal areas of Northern Pakistan or the Al Shahab controlled territories in Somalia, but could not yet be 
systematically corroborated by data. 7 
advantage of state and market structures for their own purposes. This contrasts with actions 
against  more  “symbolic”  or  politically  visible  problems  of  hostage  taking,  which  clearly 
presents a grave threat to ship crew, but may not significantly affect the structural causes, or 
conditions conducive to the development of, piracy. Thus, eradicating corruption in countries 
such as Indonesia may reap a higher benefit than the costly maritime intervention before the 
coast of Somalia. Alternatively, interventions aimed at Somalia should focus on particular 
locations or areas that display relative levels of stability (on land), rather than attempt to 
suppress operational piracy in truly ungoverned spaces, i.e. off shore. 
 
2.2  Rationality of terrorists and criminals 
Moving  beyond  structural  causes  or  factors  that  promote  different  kinds  of  transnational 
violence, one also needs to understand the motivations and behavioural patterns of terrorists. 
This is a significant foundation for devising effective strategies to deal with existing threats. 
In this context, security economics can draw on a highly sophisticated body of reasoning 
about rationality which builds on Rational Choice Theory.
8 
 
From this perspective, terrorism is typically understood as a tactic or strategy to pursue short 
run or long run goals, where the short run goals are a destabilisation of attacked economies 
and polities as well as publicity (e.g., Tavares, 2004) and the long run goal is a redistribution 
of  power  and  wealth  not  enforceable  through  the  ordinary  political  process  (Frey  and 
Luechinger, 2003). Ultimately, terror is chosen as a tool to reach political objectives as long 
as terrorists’ marginal expected benefits exceed marginal costs (Frey and Luechinger, 2003; 
Harrison,  2006).  More  loose  concepts  of  rationality  (such  as  the  concept  of  bounded 
rationality  by  Simon  (1955))  have  argued  that  such  cost benefit  calculations  necessarily 
remain limited due to a lack of information, misperceptions and cognitive biases (see for 
instance Berrebi, 2009). Other then taking all or even most of the costs and benefits of the 
available options into consideration, concepts of bounded rationality suggest that individuals 
in  reality  use  heuristics  (which  sometimes  may,  but  often  will  not  come  close  to  a 
comprehensive cost benefit analysis) before choosing a certain option. 
 
                                                 
8  It  should  be  noted  that  Rational  Choice  models  are  not  limited  to  explaining  terrorist  behaviour. 
Organised criminals seek to take advantage of globalised markets and exploit the gap between demand for illicit 
goods and services (e.g. drugs, prostitution) and their risky supply. As this “profit maximising” orientation of 
organised criminals is readily evident and politically uncontested, however, it has not been dealt with in greater 
depth in the EUSECON project. As set out in this section, this is clearly different with regard to terrorism.   8 
A related question concerns the effectiveness of terrorist behaviour. Economic analyses of 
terrorism would consider it as a “rational” activity in so far as it regularly helps to achieve 
political objectives. Researchers in this field (Abrahms, 2006, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Gupta, 
2008; Merari, 1993; Jenkins, 2006) have come to conclude that terrorism by and large has 
failed to reach any strategic (political) objective and – building on the premise of rational 
expectations     could  thus  not  be  considered  rational.  Other  scholars  (Dershowitz,  2002; 
Gunaratna, 2002; Kydd and Walter 2006; Lake, 2002; Oberschall, 2004; Victoroff, 2005), 
however,  indicate  that  terrorists  may  actually  at  least  sometimes  succeed  and  reach  their 
stated objectives.  
 
EUSECON engaged with both questions, namely whether terrorists can be considered rational 
and  effective.  As  already  discussed  above,  Freytag  et  al.  (2010a)  go  beyond  one  of  the 
standard assumptions of Rational Choice Theory – i.e. narrow self interest (Schneider et al., 
2011a: 13 14, Caplan, 2006: 94) – and posit an extended form of social rationality, whereby 
suicide attackers can act rationally for group benefit or intangible rewards, such as rewards in 
afterlife.  This  move  is  critical  to  account  for  otherwise  seemingly  irrational behaviour  of 
individuals, i.e. suicide attacks.
9  
 
Other EUSECON’s contributions have supported the idea that terrorists largely behave in a 
rational  manner,  usually  within  the  limits  of  bounded  rationality  and  partially  even  as 
instrumentally rational actors. Butler and Gates (2010) elaborate on militants’ choice not only 
of terrorist tactics but also on the selection of guerrilla warfare or terrorism as a strategy. The 
authors argue that militants’ violence can be understood in a strategic framework and that the 
choice of violence is very much based on rational considerations. Butler and Gates develop a 
conceptual  argument  why  during  situations  of  unconventional  warfare  some  groups 
intentionally  target  civilians  and  chose  terrorist  tactics,  while  others  resort  to  guerrilla 
violence. The authors conclude that the choice of tactics is very much determined by levels of 
power asymmetry. If the cost of conventional warfare were too high, groups would fall back 
on  tactics  of  guerrilla  warfare.  Given  extreme  (power)  asymmetry,  the  cost  of  guerrilla 
warfare might also be too high so that groups would fall back on terrorism. The findings 
indicate that violent groups weigh carefully costs and benefits associated with certain options. 
 
                                                 
9   For a recent rational analysis of suicide bombings, see Ayers (2008). 9 
A similar result is reported by Freytag et al. (2010b). In a statistical test of cross sectional 
time series data for 103 countries for the period of 1992 to 2004, it is shown that socio 
economic  strength  and  stability  is  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of  terrorism  but 
negatively to incidences of more violent forms of violent opposition. This result implies that 
while civil war can be prevented through improvement of socio economic conditions and 
increases in political stability, this may make terrorism more likely.  
 
In short, EUSECON supported the view that rational models can help to better understand 
which form of violence is chosen. This is not to say that violent actors always and necessarily 
act rationally, or even in a more or less bounded rational manner. In certain contexts, violence 
may also be better understood from a perspective that underlines expressive or emotive drives 
for violence. Harrison (2009) discusses counter terrorism in the Soviet Union and conjectures 
about the motivations of Armenian terrorists who could not expect to attain significant public 
recognition or even a modicum of political change in the Soviet Union.
10 From a fundamental 
perspective, Van Um (2009) discusses the explanatory power of concepts of rationality for 
terrorism and argues that empirically, terrorists often seem to deviate from instrumentally 
rational behaviour and to be motivated by other than political reasons. The author also points 
out that levels of rationality may vary within a terrorist group, complicating efforts to combat 
terrorist groups as a whole. In this regard, previous research has tried to distinguish different 
players of terror organisations and has repeatedly referred to terrorist leaders, recruits, and 
support groups all of which are likely to have different motivations (Schneider et al., 2011b: 
13).  
 
With  these  qualifications  in  mind,  EUSECON  research  has  found  that  terrorist  groups 
occasionally  achieve  their  desired  objectives,  which  speaks  to  the  question  of  long term 
effectiveness raised above. Klor and Gould (2009) use a large sample of terror attacks over 
time and across locations in Israel from 1984 to 2006 to study the impact on Israeli political 
views. They find that terrorism seems to be successful in having a significant impact on these 
political views by shifting the political landscape in Israel to the left. Israeli citizens were 
more willing to support a Palestinian state after terror attacks which can be seen as a success 
of Palestinian terror. The study also shows that terror is not always an effective tool but that 
                                                 
10   While  security  services  and  officials  in  the  Communist  state  had  to  step  up  security  measures  in 
response to these bombings, this could not be credibly regarded as a rational strategy by the Armenian terrorist 
group. Arguably, even a bounded rational actor should have realised that it would require considerably more 
violence and prospects for popular support before the repressive Soviet state would be forced to respond to any 
political or social demands.  10 
the effectiveness is of a non linear nature. While terrorism up to a certain level would make 
Israelis  more  willing  to  accept  Palestinian  demands,  Israelis  would  move  away  from  this 
position  and  become  less  willing  to  grant  any  concessions  beyond  a  certain  threshold  of 
violence. The work by Gould and Klor indicates that Palestinian violence has been rationally 
spread so that it rarely reached this critical threshold in a specific location.  
 
This relationship can furthermore be supported by linking it to the issue of public support 
raised in the previous section on the possible causes of terrorism. Butler and Gates (2010) 
stress that loss of public support may become a matter of survival for terrorist groups, if this 
support shifts away from the groups. 
 
This reflects findings within previous research, according to which groups have repeatedly 
ceased to exist due to a loss of public support which often resulted from overly brutal terrorist 
attacks and a miscalculation of the effects of such violence on the public opinion (Cf. Cronin, 
2007, 2009; Gvineria, 2009). In other words, low levels of violence put the capacity of the 
terrorist organisation into question, whereas excessive violence can alienate also supporters. 
Beyond the case of Israel that is discussed by Klor, one can point to parallel examples from 
the European history in the fight against terrorism. The most important political concessions 
were won by separatist groups in Northern Ireland and the Basque country which, for the 
most part, could largely control and sustain a medium level of violence. In contrast, Al Qaeda 
has already lost much of its public support in Third World countries, but also among possible 
sympathisers in Western Europe, due to the indiscriminate and excessive use of violence. So 
although spectacular acts of violence attract a large amount of public and media attention, 
they rarely pose a significant political challenge – at least as long as levels of violence do not 
cross  a  threshold  level  after  which  the  targeted  state  or  population  may  be  seriously 
destabilised (descent into civil war) or blackmailed (e.g. by the threat of attacks with weapons 
of mass destruction as in a regular inter state deterrence scenario). 
 
In  sum,  the  intensity  of  terrorist  violence  seems  to  have  a  direct  influence  both  on  the 
effectiveness  of  terrorist  campaigns  and  on  levels  of  support  for  terrorists’  causes.  This 
relationship as indicated in EUSECON research is illustrated in figure 2. 
 11 
Fig. 2    Relationship of intensity of violence and effectiveness of / popular support for terrorism  
 
Source: Relationship between intensity of violence and effectiveness of terrorism as indicated 
by Gould and Klor (2009). Relationship between intensity of violence and popular support for 
terrorism as indicated by Butler and Gates (2010). 
 
In short, terrorists should neither be considered mad ideologies or perfectly rational strategic 
actors. Still, their behaviour frequently seems to be in line with at least a broad understanding 
of rational behaviour. This also means that terrorists generally will react to incentives and 
disincentives  (for  instance  through  counter terrorism  measures).  Policy makers  need  to 
investigate carefully whether a specific terrorist group (or which actors within a group) can be 
considered strategically rational, since certain counter terrorism policies are only supposed to 
work under these circumstances.  
 
Second,  the  various  non linear  relations  outlined  means  that  dosage  and  prioritisation  of 
security measures is important. For instance, the use of violence by governments can undercut 
terrorist  campaigns,  but  it  can  also  stimulate  violent  action  and  increase  discrimination. 
Moreover,  while  reducing  the  likelihood  of  very  deadly  terrorist  attacks  is  obviously  a 
political  priority,  policy makers  must  ensure  that  more  restrained,  but  sustained,  terrorist 
campaigns cannot take hold either. As outlined above, such campaigns are more likely to 
attract  wider  political  support  and/or  extract  considerable  political  concessions  over  time. 
Similarly,  even  though  the  complete  absence  of  state  structures  captures  most  media  and 
political  attention,  operations  against  piracy  should  prioritise  locations  where  existing 
governance structures offer opportunities for sustained and profitable illegal business.  12 
3  Impact of Terrorism and Organised Crime 
 
The direct as well as indirect costs of terrorism and organised crime have become increasingly 
salient in recent years (Enders and Oslon, Forthcoming, Rose, 2009). This is most evident if 
one counts the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as results of the attacks of September 11. But 
also  the  European  fight  against  international  terrorism  has  imposed  serious  political  and 
economic  costs  (Schäfer,  2011).  Therefore,  Schneider  et  al.  (2011a,  2011b)  argue  that 
“impacts resulting from security responses of economic agents could incur more significant 
economic repercussions than the direct impacts of a terror attack” (Schneider et al., 2011b: 
49).  
 
EUSECON has added new insight in three related issue areas. The first is on the economic 
analysis of income from organised crime fed into the financial sector. While this is only one 
element of the costs of organised crime (for estimates of the costs of crime see e.g. Lynch, 
2010), the analysis shows that income from crime measured this way is substantial, even in 
terms of world income. Terrorism, while only a small part of the total amount of illicit money 
in the financial system warrants particular attention, as cutting of financing is often seen as an 
important instrument in counter terrorism. Work within EUSECON on the effectiveness of 
counterfinancing  as  a  policy  instrument  indicates  that  this  has  likely  been  effective  in 
suppressing  international  financing  of  terrorism,  albeit  with  some  side effects  (Brzoska, 
2011).  
 
A second contribution from EUSECON has been additional work on the impact and costs of 
terrorism  in  particular  areas  of  the  economy.  The  contributions  made  by  EUSECON  are 
reported here in two sections, one focusing on stock market effects, and the other on relations 
between terrorism and other sectors.
11 These sections show that markets and societies display 
a relatively high degree of stability, in face of terrorist attacks, even though there is also clear 
evidence for temporary strong, potentially “irrational”, reactions.  
 
A  third  contribution  is  the  integration  of  research  on political  costs  of  terrorism  into  the 
economics  of  security.  Public  opinion  as  well  as  voter  behaviour  show  considerable 
sensitivity to terror attacks. Even though the effects, like those on markets, often are short 
                                                 
11   While  much  of  the  existing  research  focused  on  the  impact  of  terrorism  on  the  tourism  sector, 
EUSECON put more emphasis on other sectors, such as stock and commodity markets, as outlined below. 13 
lived, they are substantial immediately after attacks. This means politicians may be instigated 
by their interest in the maximisation of political support to meet the demand for action at the 
peaks of public attention, and not at average levels of concern.  
 
3.1  Financing of organised crime and transnational terrorism 
Cash is the preferred initial currency in many crimes. However, it is often converted into 
financial assets and passed through the financial system, mostly with the objective to hide its 
origins. In a series of Working Papers (Schneider and Windischbauer, 2010; Schneider, 2010; 
Schneider and Caruso, 2011; Schneider, 2011), the well known specialist on black markets 
Schneider (and his co authors) present and discuss sources of criminal finance and the volume 
of money laundering. Schneider’s own  estimation method, MIMIC reflects these linkages 
between legitimate and illegitimate business activities.  
 
According  to  this pioneering  model,  criminal  financing  is  channelled  through  formal  and 
informal  systems  and  comes  from  a  variety  of  origins,  of  which  the  most  important  are 
(Schneider and Caruso, 2011: 12): 
  (1) International and domestic criminal activities, such as blackmailing and corruption; 
  (2) Protection rackets, including from diaspora migrant communities; 
(3) High level transnational crime: fraud, illegal production and smuggling of drugs, 
kidnapping, armed robbery, trafficking in human beings; and 
(4) Investments in legitimate business of earlier criminal income. 
 
Based  on  this  model,  Schneider  et  al.  develop  estimates  of  the  overall  share  of  criminal 
activities  in  global  production.  Various  academics  and  international  organisations  have 
previously estimated the share of finance from illegal sources at two to five per cent of global 
income, with most of it coming from drug trafficking. The drug trade, followed by illegal 
trade in arms and economic crime are the most important sources of money laundering which 
has been estimated to have an annual volume of somewhere between  400 billion to 2.85 
trillion USD. Schneider’s own estimate according to the MIMIC model is 790 billion USD in 
2006. In this estimation procedure, the amount of money laundered is treated as a latent (i.e. 
unobservable) variable, whose relation to a number of determining factors, such as sources for 
illegal  finance  (i.e.  various  criminal  activities)  and  indicators  for  its  volume  (confiscated 
money, prosecuted, persons, etc.) is estimated. In a second stage, a calibration procedure is 
used to translate the relative values from the MIMIC estimation into an absolute estimate. 14 
 
Terrorist organisations command considerably smaller amounts of finance. For the period 
1999 2004,  using  the  MIMIC  procedure  Schneider  (with  Caruso)  estimates  the  annual 
financial flows (i.e. the budget) of Al Qaeda at between 20 to 50 million USD per year. For all 
terrorist  organisation  in  the  sample  of  his  study,  he  estimates  that  donations  from 
governments,  wealthy  individuals  and  religious  groups  account  for  35 50%;  followed  by 
involvement  in  the  drug  business  (30 35%)  and  classical  crime  activities  (such  as 
blackmailing and mostly kidnapping) (Schneider and Caruso, 2011: 21 24). 
 
Even though income is quite small (compared to that made in organised crime), it proved to 
be sufficient for maintaining international terrorist organisations, including the promotion of 
ideological material and the execution of serious or repeated attacks. Therefore, major efforts 
have  been  made  to  suppress  transnational  criminal  financing.  An  extensive  international 
regime  to  counter  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  internationally  lead  and 
coordinated by the Financial Action Task Force, has been established. Brzoska (2011) argues 
that  this  regime  has  been  quite  effective  in  reducing  transnational  terrorist  financing. 
However, it has also had major costs, both in terms of tangible costs for banks, other financial 
actors, and, in the end, customers of formal and informal financial systems, and intangible 
costs in terms of confidentiality in financial data. This tradeoff will be returned to in more 
detail further below.   
 
3.2  Financial (stock market) effects 
EUSECON researchers found strong evidence for short term market volatility as a result of 
the threat or of acts of  terrorism, but also found that long term effects remain limited in 
mature European markets. 
 
Christofis et al. (2010) study terrorism in Turkey and particularly the impact of the bombings 
in 1999, 2003, and 2008 on the Turkish financial markets. The study covers the period from 
1997 to 2009 and determines the returns of specific indices from Banks, Trade and Industry. 
Abnormal returns are taken as proof for the economic impact of terrorism on the financial 
sector. Evidence is found for a significant impact (in terms of an abnormal return) of the 
terrorist attacks for the bombings of 1999 and 2003 in particular. In 1999, the Tourism and 
Industry sector was particularly hit. In 2003, indices of Banks and Tourism fell by 11%. The 15 
impact of the bombings in Turkey on the financial markets  was only short lived and the 
indices rebounded very quickly, however. 
 
Drakos (2009b) shows
12 for 22 countries for the period 1994 2004 that terrorist incidents with 
minor  psychosocial  impact
13  on  average  reduced  stock  market  returns  only  slightly  by 
approximately 0.07 percent while the reduction in the occurrence of incidents with major 
psychosocial impact is estimated as being approximately 0.60. This indicates that investor 
mood, which is likely  to be more affected by  attacks with major psychosocial impact, is 
important in determining the size of the stock market effect of terrorist attacks. This is also 
confirmed by Kollias et al. (2010), in a study of the terrorist attacks on the major local stock 
markets in the UK and Greece for the period 1990 2009. Attacks with particular political 
significance have larger stock market effects. The study particularly addresses the question 
whether there has been a change in stock market reactions over time in the two cases studied. 
While the result of the empirical investigation, using both GARCH and EGARCH
14 models is 
not unequivocal, resilience to such incidents seems to have grown over time. 
 
EUSECON research could also find support for previous findings according to which the 
economic costs of terrorism may not only unfold in the targeted state. Rather, through the 
international linkages of the financial markets, spill over effects of major events in particular 
have  caused  serious  economic  damage  in  remote  countries.  Drakos  (2009d)  provides  an 
assessment  of  the  various  potential  channels  through  which  terrorist  activity  can  exerts 
systematic effects on foreign stock markets. Using a pooled panel for the effects of two major 
terrorist events (the Madrid attack on March 11, 2004 and the London attack on July 7, 2005) 
in  68  stock  markets,  he  finds  that  bilateral  trade  linkages  with  the  immediately  affected 
country are the most significant determinants of stock market reaction. Alternative channels, 
such as degree of globalisation and stock market capitalisation in the country in question are 
also, but less important, factors in shaping the ripple effects of major terrorist attacks. In a 
parallel  paper,  Drakos  (2009c)  separately  investigates  differences  in  the  effects  between 
countries with higher and lower terrorism risks. In line with general investment theory, he 
finds that stock market reactions are greater in countries which are themselves subject to 
                                                 
12   On the basis of a Pooled GARCH Panel. GARCH stands for “Generalised autoregressive conditionally 
heteroscedastic” and refers to models that primarily aim to model volatility in financial time series. 
13   Data on psychosocial impact is taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) developed at the 
University of Maryland. 
14   EGARCH („exponential general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic”) is a specific form of the 
GARCH model. 16 
terrorist attacks. Investor sentiment, which can be surmised to be stronger in countries with 
higher terrorist risks, is another factor shaping the ripple effect in stock markets from terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Added value of EUSECON research is provided by the finding that even remote and minor 
terrorist incidents may unfold significant repercussions on the US and European markets also 
driven  by  perceptions  of  insecurity.  Marvins  and  Garvey  (2010)  find  evidence  that  the 
bombing of the UN headquarter in Iraq in 2003 had a significant impact on trading patterns in 
the US financial market. The researchers argue that this was still related to the 9/11 attacks 
which had caused a persistent general feeling of insecurity. 
The importance of psychological factors on the stock market effects of terrorist attacks also 
comes out in other EUSECON research. Garvey and Mullins (2009) highlight the significant 
impact in economic terms of transnational terrorism by studying the impact of the Madrid 
bombings in 2004. The researchers find that feelings of insecurity have a dramatic impact on 
the financial market. As it became clear at that time that it had not been the Basque group 
ETA  who  had  committed  the  attacks  but  Islamic  terrorists,  the  markets  showed  a  strong 
negative reaction. In this sense, novel and unexpected terrorism seems to have a deep effect in 
the feeling of insecurity and to trigger an acute market response. 
 
In sum, mature (European) markets have shown a surprising resilience and recovered from 
terrorist attacks quickly. On the other hand, EUSECON highlights that while the seize of 
effects on financial markets has been dependent on the political, social and psychological 
significance  of  an  attack,  stock  markets  are  sensitive  even  to  minor  and  remote  acts  of 
terrorism.  An  important  condition  shaping  the  effects  is  a  general  feeling  of  insecurity. 
Psychological factors, always important for stock markets, are also important in the case of 
terrorism. While market participants will not be oblivious to direct economic costs, such as 
those of the attacks on September 11, 2001, heightened feelings of insecurity are shown, in 
research, to amplify stock market effects.  
 
3.3  Other economic costs of terrorism 
EUSECON adds further value to the research on impact and costs of terrorism by studying the 
impact on sectors that have so far been widely neglected. First, research has been conducted 
on the impact on the labour markets of Muslims in the US and the UK in the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks. Rabby  and Rodgers (2010) show that  young UK Muslims experienced a 17 
decline in employment rates after the London bombings. Specifically, the employment rate 
decreased by 10% compared to non Muslim migrants, with the effect being most pronounced 
for very young Muslims with low qualifications. This discrimination is particularly important 
as UK Muslims are on average significantly younger, and face high obstacles of integration 
into the regular labour market. Similarly, Rabby and Rodgers (2009) highlight that the 9/11 
terrorist attacks had a negative impact on the status of employment of individuals from the 
Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan, i.e. of individuals that share similar nativity profiles with 
the  terrorists.  While  this  result  may  not  make  a  significant  impact  on  overall  economic 
performance and is of a temporary nature, this impact of terrorist attacks should attract more 
attention from policy makers, as it indicates specific and subtle patterns of discrimination. 
New terrorist attacks would lead to repeated and new obstacles to improving this integration, 
while  public  opinion  may  feel  reinforced  in  drawing,  and  thus  actually  creating,  a  link 
between Muslim religion and economic underperformance. 
  
Another innovative take on the economic costs of terrorism and other forms of extreme events 
is  performed  by  Brück  et  al.  (2010b).  They  show  that  entrepreneurial  activity  is  not 
necessarily  decreasing  after  terrorist  attacks,  which  mitigates  the  long term  economic 
repercussions of such events. The critical insight is that while the overall economic impact of 
terrorist attacks may be negative, new business opportunities (mostly for smaller and more 
flexible new firms) could counterbalance or off set the initial damage. This could serve as a 
foundation  for  more  policy  recommendations  to  stimulate  entrepreneurial  activity  in  the 
aftermath  of  crises.  In  other  words,  policy makers  should  not  only  focus  on  supporting 
established companies that are hit by terrorist attacks (such as airlines), but also facilitate the 
creation  of  new  enterprise  (e.g.  by  providing  a  stable  framework  for  investments  and  by 
easing access to capital). 
 
3.4  Wider political impact and public opinion  
The  direct  impact  of  terrorism  with  regard  to  specific  political  demands,  as  expected  by 
rational actor models, has already been discussed above. This section delves further into the 
wider effects and largely uncontrolled or unspecific effects of terrorist, which are at least as 
important to account for as the direct physical effects of terrorist attacks.  
 
Bozzoli and Müller (2009) document statistically that terrorism has a direct impact on public 
opinion and also on the acceptance of security measures at the expensive of civil liberties. 18 
This has often been reported in qualitative studies on the fight against terrorism, but rarely 
corroborated in a systematic manner. By studying the case of the London bombings in 2004, 
support for this effect has been found for the entire population and has not been limited to 
certain groups of the general public. This provides the basis for expanded security policy 
making in the aftermath of attacks. Similarly, Drakos and Konstantinou (2011) show that 
public spending generally goes up after terrorist attacks and serious crime, even though this 
does not have a clear or measurable impact on the subsequent rate of terrorism and crime. 
This simple, yet striking macro economic analysis demonstrates the prevalence of political 
overreactions, or ill focused policy making, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.  
 
In electoral terms, Gardeazabal (2010) finds that domestic terrorism in Spain has an impact on 
voters’ share for the major parties PP (Partido Popular) and PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español).  Gardeazabal  studies  the  impact  of  economic  factors  and  terrorism  on  voting 
behaviour.  He  finds  that  both  economic  factors  (unemployment,  inflation)  and  terrorism 
activity on the national aggregate level have a statistically significant impact on vote shares 
particularly at the provincial level. In short, there is evidence for a distinct political shift to the 
right  after  terrorist  attacks.  This  finding  may  be  questioned  in  the  case  of  international 
terrorism, however, as a right wing government lost power in response to the terrorist attacks 
of Madrid in March 2004.  
 
So despite considerable evidence on the wider political impact of terrorism, the evidence 
should not be overstated – which mirrors the above argument about the long term resilience 
of mature economies. Voters in liberal democracies also remain sensitive to other concerns 
and costs of policies. Bozzoli and Müller (2009), for instance, also show that despite the 
heightened threat concerns, support for additional funding in security policies remains limited 
to  the  first  days  after  the  attack.
15  When  moving  away  from  the  immediate  aftermath  of 
terrorist attacks, there is even less evidence for a permanently terrorised public. Drakos and 
Müller  (2010a,  2010b)  use  data  from  the  Eurobarometer  opinion  surveys  (2003 2008)  to 
explore  whether  terrorism  risk  are  mirrored  in  subjective  feelings  of  insecurity  (risk 
perception).  Overall,  it  emerges  that  terrorism  generally  ranks  quite  low  with  European 
publics, which corresponds to the fairly low number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, competing 
security and political issues, such as crime rates or housing costs, reduce the likelihood that 
                                                 
15   Entrepreneurial activity in the aftermath of terrorist attacks (Brück et al., 2010b) could also indicate that 
public opinion and confidence is more robust than commonly assumed.  19 
terrorism is mentioned as a prime concern.
16 So even if personal characteristics and political 
attitudes also play a role,
17 public opinion in Europe is not excessively sensitive to the threat 
of terrorism.  
 
However, the most serious indirect impact of terrorism may be its long term effect on civil 
rights  and  legal  systems.  Against  the  background  of  a  large  number  of  qualitative  and 
historical studies on problematic aspects of counter terrorism policy, Goderis and Versteeg 
(2009) present a pioneering comparative and quantitative analysis that tests the effects of 9/11 
and alliance with the US on human rights violations. The paper finds that during the first five 
years after 9/11, there was no discernible check by legislatures on executive action. In other 
words, governments across the world acted in accordance with majority views when they 
breached human rights. Only independent and non majoritarian judicial review provides an 
effective  counterbalance,  when  controlling  for  many  other  variables,  such  as  general 
democracy scores, legal culture or participation in wars.
18 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
However, Goderis and Versteeg also show that human rights breaches decreased after 2006 
even in countries without such judicial review. This finding is in line with arguments about 
public opinion outlined above, namely that societies are not permanently fixated on the threat 
of terrorism, particularly if overall attack rates remain low.  In short, EUSECON research 
shows  that  public  opinion  and  electoral  systems  are  vulnerable  to  overreaction  and 
overspending in relation to terrorist attacks, particularly if the political system does not allow 
for non majoritarian checks. Over the medium term, the shift in favour of more repressive 
policies and increased security spending clearly levels off, and public opinion shows resurgent 
sensitivity to alternative concerns.  
 
                                                 
16  In this context, it should be noted that EUSECON also uncovered a hitherto unnoticed interaction effect 
between terrorism and crime. Based on Israeli data from 2000 to 2005, Gould and Stecklov (2009) shows that 
terror attacks are negatively correlated with crime levels. They conclude that this may be due to an increased 
police street presence after terrorist attacks. Furthermore, crimes in private homes (burglary) are also reduced, as 
people tend to stay more at home after a terrorist attack instead of going out.  
17   People  on  the  right  on  the  political  spectrum  are  more  likely  to  be  concerned  about  terrorism.  In 
contrast, men are less like to worry about terrorism. 
18   For current EU policy debates, this is highly relevant, as the judicial review powers of the European 
Court of Justice in security affairs have been upgraded with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, 
the EU formally acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights, which already helped to hold European 
governments to account when dealing with issues such as extraordinary renditions or indefinite detention. It goes 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the future prospects of judicial accountability in EU security policy, as 
it also involves a complex interplay between a wide range of other actors, such as the European Data Protection 
Adviser or the European Parliament.    
 20 
3.5  Policy implications 
Insecurity has impacts beyond immediate damage, loss of income and other direct costs. It 
increases volatility and uncertainty in markets and affects people in their ways of life, which 
finds expression in public opinion polls and voting behaviour. Policy makers in theory have a 
number of options to deal with the broad perception of the costs of insecurity and peaks in 
attention. For instance, they could in theory ignore them, basing their decisions on direct 
costs. However, this theoretical option is difficult to implement in a competitive political 
system.  Sensitivity  to  public  sentiments  is  a  core  of  democratic  political  systems.  Thus, 
politicians not responding to broad perceptions and peaks of insecurity are likely to come 
under attack from other politicians (who may even fan feelings of insecurity).  
 
Another problem is that decision makers have to deal with the possibility of major threats or 
attacks in the future. Even if their occurrence may be unlikely, not to adequately prepare for a 
‘high impact’ event could seriously undermine trust in the political system – as could be 
gauged from the shocked reaction of US citizens to the attacks of 9/11. In short, there is no 
“objective” way to estimate the “right” level of policy. Even if the various costs and impact of 
different security threats could be measured – which is a demanding task in many ways – the 
weighing  of  these  costs  depends  on  subjective  factors.  Nevertheless,  given  the  mounting 
evidence on significant political and fiscal over reactions in the aftermath of security crises, 
while  markets  and  societies  have been  fairly  resilient, political  actors  should  increasingly 
consider the long term costs and benefits of security policies.  
 
 
4  Assessing current counter-terrorism and security policy  
 
This section investigates how European security and counter terrorism policies and strategies 
could be  assessed,  and  possibly  improved,  in  greater  detail.  Economic  research  can  offer 
several different approaches to policy evaluation. First, economic models of rational action 
(or  game  theory)  can  illuminate  whether  policy makers  cooperate  in  collectively  rational 
ways.  This  includes  the  question  of  international  cooperation  in  response  to  transnational 
threats. For instance, do defensive installations against terrorism only displace the threat to a 
different location, or can they reduce the overall threat levels (Brandt and Sandler, 2010)? 
Second, security instruments and investments can be compared to their intended effect or 
outputs.  For  instance,  does  the  installation  of  a  new  generation  of  security  scanners 21 
significantly improve detection rates or could an increase in personnel be more cost effective? 
Third, cost benefit analyses aims to assess policy outcomes over the medium term and at a 
more systemic level, i.e. including comparisons with other possible courses of action or policy 
objectives  (ideally  in  fully  monetised  terms).  For  instance,  are  new  aviation  security 
regulations needed to prevent further disasters and attacks, or should government rather invest 
in road safety or public health campaigns? 
 
Taken together, these three approaches could ideally show how policies may be optimised 
under conditions of scarcity, collective action problems, and unclear long term benefits in 
relation  to  both  direct  and  opportunity  costs.  Yet  one  should  be  aware  of  fundamental 
limitations.  Full and precise cost assessments, and cost benefit analyses, remain out of reach 
due to incomplete data or inherent uncertainty, while security decision makers always have to 
operate under considerable constraints.   
 
4.1  Collective action and the provision of transnational security  
Although most Western countries and international organisations have invested heavily in the 
fight against terrorism, it remains questionable whether these efforts can at all be effective.  
This does not only concern the question whether the complex structural causes of terrorism 
are actually amenable to policy interventions (first part of this paper), or could be paid for 
(second  section  of  this  paper).  Economists  have  also  argued  that  the  fight  against 
(international) terrorism and other serious crime pose collective action dilemmas (Enders and 
Sandler, 2008) that may frustrate even the best of policies.  
 
In  abstract,  defensive  policies  appear  preferable  to  aggressive  policies  that  may  increase 
support to terrorist groups. Yet due to the fact that terrorism can choose between a wide 
variety  of  targets  to  strike  fear  and  attract  publicity,  governments  are  faced  with  several 
dilemmas. They cannot reasonably defend all targets, while attacks may simply be displaced 
to another location.
19 At the same time, cooperation between different security providers or 
several states is difficult, as security is typically a public good. Public goods invite free riding, 
as rational actors do not voluntarily pay for a good that they could enjoy while it is produced 
by others.  
 
                                                 
19  Similar dynamics may be made out with regard to the fight against serious crime that has displayed 
significant innovation and diversification in the face of government repression. The extended and highly costly 
“war on drugs” exemplifies this dynamic.  22 
Governments typically resolve this problem by their power to command and to tax. But this 
option is not readily available in the case of transnational cooperation between sovereign 
states. Purely national security policies invite other collective action problems, whereby each 
country seeks to protect itself, but may only deflect the threat to another location that is less 
well defended. These weaker countries can, in turn, serve as a springboard for transnational 
threats,  which  undermines  collective  welfare  and  security  objectives  of  all  states.  This  is 
especially the case of terrorism that is often subject to weakest link effects, whereby attackers 
exploit vulnerabilities in one part of the system to strike elsewhere.
20  
 
EUSECON built on this well established economic reasoning and investigated how European 
security  policy  can  be  understood  as  a  collective  good,  but  also  avoid  collective  action 
problems. Engerer (2009) agrees that security is generally a non excludable public good, but 
that specific policy instruments to counter new transnational threats can come in all different 
mixtures of excludability and rivalry. This deviation from a pure public good model, in turn, 
raises the prospects for cooperation and collective security provision.  
 
Drawing  on  this  conceptual  groundwork,  Bossong  (2011a)  focuses  more  specifically  on 
European  and  international  cooperation  in  response  to  terrorism,  which  has  widely  been 
criticised as ineffective (Bureš, 2011; Coolsaet, 2010). As just mentioned, general models of 
collective action indicate that international terrorists are at an advantage over governments, 
which  either  merely  displace  the  threat  or  get  very  little  benefit  out  of  their  defensive 
investments.  However, Bossong (2011a) argues that preventive and responsive policies to 
counter  terrorism  are  not  necessarily  subject  to weakest  link  dynamics,  and  can be  made 
exclusive to a club of countries, which alleviates collective action problems. Furthermore, 
contextual factors can support international cooperation. This is especially evident in the case 
of the EU, where dense institutional interactions exist. Thus, the EU could “add value” to 
national  counter terrorism  by  building  mutual  trust  and  addressing  weakest  link 
vulnerabilities.  
 
But Bossong also argues that the EU’s fight against terrorism is still sub optimal from a 
collective action perspective. Measures that can help to prevent or respond to terrorism by a 
significant pooling of resources, such as in the  case of foreign policy or civil protection, 
                                                 
20  The previous section on the indirect costs of terrorism also showed that attacks can have far reaching 
repercussions beyond the immediate location or even country. 23 
remain underdeveloped due to weak institutional mechanisms that could regulate the use of 
common assets.
21 Finally, the EU’s development of innovative policies in the fight against 
terrorism, i.e. ‘best shot’ efforts to prevent further attacks, are undercut by a lack of relevant 
competences and expertise at the EU level. So far, smaller groups of member states have 
retained  the  lead  for  developing  programs  for  reducing  ‘violent  radicalization  and 
recruitment’ into terrorism. It remains to be seen whether recent EU efforts to create new 
forms of knowledge and best practice exchange can generate more collective utility.   
 
A different and economically significant area for better EU cooperation in security affairs is 
raised  by  Marti  (2010,  2011).  Based  on  an  extensive  and  groundbreaking  survey  of  the 
civilian European security market, he argues that the bulk of small or middle sized companies 
cannot  be  expected  to  operate  effectively  without  outside  intervention.  Coordination  of 
demand for both security goods and services is required when agents have to simultaneously 
invest  to  achieve  a  certain  desired  level  of  security.  In  Europe,  high  levels  of  market 
fragmentation  and  intense  international  competition  underline  the  case  for  political 
intervention. This mainly, but not exclusively, refers to the US, which invests significantly 
more in technological research and has been able to set most relevant industrial standards, 
which favours US market actors. So even if the U.S. generally tends to over invest in security 
(see also below), an economic analysis indicates the potential for a strategic industrial policy 
in Europe.  
 
The challenge is to profit from the externalities of U.S. research and replicate well proven and 
effective solutions, design smart agreements on licences and to appropriately tailor products 
to  real  market  needs.  In  contrast,  policy makers  should  aim  to  minimise  the  inherent 
tendencies  for  oligopolies  and  rent seeking  in  the  area  of  high end  and  capital intensive 
security goods.  
 
4.2  Cost effectiveness 
In  sum,  EU  security  cooperation  could  ensure  a  higher  degree  of  cohesion  and 
competitiveness.  However,  these  analyses  remain  at  a  fairy  high  level  of  abstraction  and 
include a bundle of different policies. This needs to be broken down further, as there is a 
serious  lack  of  systematic  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of  specific  counter terrorism 
instruments (Lum et al., 2006; Van Um and Pisoiu, 2011).  
                                                 
21   Similarly, Brück and Xu (2011) provide a quantitative analysis of patterns of European aid policies, 
which underlines the lack of cross national coordination of resource intensive policies. 24 
 
Bossong (2011b) questioned whether the EU’s own review and assessment mechanisms for 
counter terrorism  have  made  headway  in  this  respect.  The  paper  discusses  how  a  “peer 
review”  among  security  officials  of  EU  member  states  helped  to  define  basic 
recommendations  for  counter terrorism  policy,  such  as  improved  information  sharing  and 
training  of  national  security  actors  or better  use of  security sensitive  information  in  legal 
prosecutions (among others). The EU furthermore provided a formalised reporting system on 
the  implementation  of  these  recommendations,  which  supported  international  trust. 
Nevertheless, first EU peer review (that was concluded in 2007) could not be said to have 
significantly influenced national security systems, but rather shadowed event driven policy 
making after terrorist attacks. Furthermore, this review could not be regarded as a thorough 
policy evaluation, which could assess the appropriate level of security investments in respect 
to cross national threat variation and competing policy objectives. This was underlined by the 
second round of EU peer reviews on response mechanisms to serious terrorist attacks and 
disasters. This review listed a large number of ‘best practices’ in this issue area, but without 
providing any  evident rationale or justification for selecting these practices, such as cost 
effectiveness.   
 
More fundamentally, EUSECON underlined why it remains difficult to measure – and thus to 
legitimise  or  criticise  –  policy  measures  in  this  field.  Van  Dongen  (2009)  highlights  a 
fundamental methodological problem in the area of counter terrorism: How can we reliably 
link policy interventions with desired effects, if success is defined by a counter factual, i.e. 
the absence of an attack? It does not seem feasible to escape this dilemma by correlating 
“average” attack rates with overall security investments. Terrorist attacks differ in impact and 
origin, while the absence (or decrease) of attacks is potentially caused by an infinite number 
of factors. Last but not least, the numbers of terrorist attacks may go down in a specific area, 
but may be substituted elsewhere.  
 
These difficulties were spelt out in more detail by other EUSECON researchers that focused 
on particular counter terrorism instruments or security policies from the perspective of goal 
attainment  and  cost effectiveness.
22  The  cases  under  investigation  cover  a  wide  range  of 
counter terrorism policies as defined by the four strands of the EU counter terrorism strategy, 
namely to prevent, pursue, protect from and respond to terrorism.  
                                                 
22   A conceptualised overview of academic studies on counter terrorist effectiveness was provided by Van 
Um and Pisoiu (2011). 25 
 
Stutzer and Zehnder (2010) explore the security technology of camera surveillance (CCTV) 
that  should  help  both  to  prevent  and  pursue  terrorism  (and  crime).  CCTV  has  gained 
particular  prominence  after  the  London  bombings,  as  the  attacker  as  well  as  subsequent 
copycat attackers have been identified, though not deterred, by this instrument. Its proponents 
argue that the use of CCTV saves manpower, while increasing public confidence. However, 
Stutzer and Zehnder make clear that there is no methodologically sound evaluation of these 
claims. At best, research pointed to a highly context specific impact of CCTV on crime rates, 
which  is  also  vulnerable  to  displacement  effects  (see  above).  Skepticism  is  all  the  more 
warranted in the case of terrorism. No terrorist attack has hitherto clearly been prevented due 
to CCTV, whereas CTTV images of attackers may play into the hands of terrorists who aim to 
achieve public attention and spread fear.
23 The biggest danger lies in a defensive arms race, 
whereby CTTV spreads from “high security” locations all across society, which constitutes a 
collectively  irrational  outcome.  In  sum,  the  authors  argue  that  the  growth  of  CTTV 
installations could not only be explained by rational calculations alone, at least when it is 
intended as a deterrent for terrorism and serious crime.
24  
 
The  fight  against  the  financing  of  terrorism  can  also  be  seen  as  a  contribution  to  the 
prevention as well as the pursuit of terrorism. As just touched upon above, the EU (in line 
with the US, the FATF and the UN) has made considerable strides in this field. Yet there is a 
big gap between policy output (such as new financial regulation) and intended policy impact. 
Brzoska (2011) argues that measures have been inflated beyond their defendable level, as a 
climate  of  high  risk  and  uncertainty  have  blocked  efforts  to  systematically  measure  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those measures. Brzoska emphasises that extending counter 
terrorist  financing  (CTF)  measures  imposes  costs, both  in  terms  of  tangible  costs  for  the 
financial  sectors  and  the  customers,  and  intangible  costs  in  terms  of  confidentiality  of 
financial  data  and  erosion  of  basic  rights,  that  have  not  been  taken  into  account.  This 
corresponds to the growing legal literature on the problematic sides of the fight against the 
financing of terrorism.  
 
                                                 
23   Similarly, CCTV images of crime may not reduce crime rates, but rather accentuate the visibility of 
crime (and thus the demand for security technologies). 
24   Marti (2011) adds that CCTV may have also spread due to falling prices. Lower prices may justify 
investments  for  individual  actors,  even  if  effectiveness  is  low  or  questionable.  However,  the  problem  of  a 
collective over investment due to displacement effects and accentuation of public worry remain in place. 26 
Finally, in the area of protection and response to terrorism, Ramseger et al. (2009) highlight 
that it is very difficult to ascertain whether measures against CBRN attacks are adequate with 
regard to the expected damages. Existing data is highly fragmented and based on extremely 
diverse scenarios. At best, preventive and protective costs need to be distinguished. The costs 
of  responding  to  an  actual  CBRN  attack  dwarf  most  passive  preventive  costs  (such  as 
securing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction). Therefore, measures that aim to prevent 
CBRN attacks should still be worthwhile investments, even if the likelihood of such attacks 
has  previously  been  exaggerated.  Beyond  such  very  general  considerations,  however,  it 
remains  currently  impossible  to  provide  precise  estimates  of  an  adequate  or  optimal 
investment level, or how public CBRN policies could be effectively combined with private 
investments for protecting productive assets, such as factories or infrastructure networks. 
 
In sum, subjecting counter terrorism policies to cost benefit analysis generate inconclusive or 
critical  assessments.  The  range  of  counter terrorism  instruments  covered  in  EUSECON 
further highlights that this reading applies to all aspects of a comprehensive counter terrorism 
strategy.  This  contrasts  with  the  general  benefits  of  transnational  security  cooperation  to 
resolve collective action problems that were outlined in the previous section. Thus, one can 
infer that international cooperation and coordination is desirable, but that the supply of certain 
security goods or policies should be made subject to stringent evaluation to limit the risk of 
wasteful (or even harmful) investments.  
 
These somewhat contrasting findings underline the need for further economic research on 
policy evaluation. One possibility would be to expand the dialogue between economists and 
the growing field of quantitative research in criminology.
25 Here one could witness a dramatic 
increase of quasi experimental research designs that seek to isolate the effects of a particular 
policy intervention. But even this “gold standard” of scientific inference (Stoker, 2010) is not 
without serious problems when it comes to scaling results from a location or population under 
study to a wider area or country. Methodological obstacles are even higher in the case of 
terrorism that cannot be quasi experiments. The alternative of purely probabilistic reasoning 
tends to be deficient (Furedi, 2008; Brown and Cox, 2011; Salter, 2008), particularly if purely 
                                                 
25  For  the  difficulties  of  bringing  the  disciplines  together,  see  Zedlewski  (2009).  Dubbner  and  Levitt 
(2007), in contrast, provide a positive example. They argued that it was ultimately a change in birthrates other 
than different micro level interventions that made a decisive impact on crime rates. This argument has been 
criticized, but attracted considerable attention, among criminologists.  27 
hypothetical “worst case” scenarios dominate political discourse and public imagination (De 
Goede, 2008). 
 
4.3  Cost-benefit analyses and strategic policy guidance 
While  detailed policy  evaluations  may be particularly  desirable  at  this  stage,  cost benefit 
analyses at a macro level also need to be developed further. Mueller (2006; 2010a) assessed 
the  US  counter terrorism  on  the  basis  of  a  heuristic  cost  benefit  calculation,  whereby  he 
compared the general increase in Homeland Security spending with expected saved lifes. The 
results clearly indicate that US Homeland Security spending has an exceedingly low cost 




In Europe, it is much harder to aggregate data on security spending and set in relation to long 
term  and  monetised  benefits.  Data  remains  fragmented  or  is  simply  unavailable.  From  a 
political  perspective,  Heller  (2009)  shows  that  the  very  concept  of  costs  has  not  been 
effectively  developed  in  EU  policy  discussions  on  internal  security.  The  proliferation  of 
strategic  documents  in  this  issue  area  should,  therefore,  not be  misinterpreted.  Instead  of 
defining priorities and possible course of action under conditions of scarcity and conflicting 
objectives – as an idealised understanding of strategy would imply  , these policy documents 
are more likely to promote security policy making and investments with little regard to social 
and economic costs. 
 
Therefore, further fundamental research and data gathering must be undertaken before more 
substantive and credible cost benefit analyses can be presented for European security policy 
making. At this stage, EUSECON helped to clarify various questions and challenges that need 
to be tackled in this respect. Müller and De Ree (2009) provide a formal exposition of policy 
makers’ cost benefit calculations that should minimise the effects of terrorism as well as the 
costs  of  countermeasures.  As  outlined  over  the  course  of  this  paper,  EUSECON  made  a 
significant contribution to fill the different variables of such a calculation. First, it underlined 
the  benefits  of  dealing  with  terrorists  and  serious  criminal  as  rational  actors.  Second,  it 
provided increasingly precise and comprehensive assessments of both the direct and indirect 
                                                 
26  A related question is whether aggregate security spending clearly reflect non functional distributional 
conflicts or not (Prante and Bohara, 2008; Mueller and Stewart, 2011). At the time of writing, the debate has 
gained yet more salience in the US that has to reduce its security spending across the board. Yet it should also be 
noted that Muellers' simple argument has been challenged (Eller and Gerber, 2010; Mueller, 2010b). 28 
costs of terrorism. Yet it needs to be acknowledged that much more needs to be known about 
the benefits of specific policy interventions (see above), before all sides of the equation can be 
estimated with reasonable precision. And security policy making as well as academic analysis 
will continue to be conducted under conditions of considerable uncertainty and the influence 
of  partisan  interest.  A  fully  “evidence based”  or  “cost effective”  approach  to  security 
provision will remain a distant ideal, even if it is very much worth striving for. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
Ten years after the attacks of September 11, it has become widely accepted that the US War 
on Terror has become overly costly. Even if the recent elimination of Bin Laden may have 
critically weakened Al Qaeda, terrorist groups increasingly point to the economic effects of 
their attacks and of subsequent counter terrorism measures. In fact, economic warfare seems 
to have turned into one of the major drivers of transnational terrorism (see Libicki et al., 2007; 
Berrebi, 2009). At the same time, transnational organised crime and unconventional security 
threats, such as piracy, exert considerable pressure on Western governments to constantly 
review and improve their security policies. Security economics and EUSECON can support 
decision makers to address these challenges in various ways: 
 
Rational models of the drivers and motivations of terrorism and other forms of serious crime 
have  proven  to  generate  significant  insights,  even  if  their  application  remains  context 
dependent. Thus, the first task for policy makers is a careful analysis of the motivation of 
terrorist  groups,  including  a  differentiation  between  different  levels  of  hierarchy  within 
groups. This provides the basis for sophisticated counter terrorism policies that may pursue 
different  objectives  and  levels  at  the  same  time,  such  as  arresting  frontline  terrorists  and 
deterring  terrorist  leadership.  At  the  same  time,  policy  makers  need  to  address  wider 
conditions that are conducive to the emergence of terrorism.  
 
Furthermore,  economic  methods  illuminate  complex  relationships  between  conditions  that 
promote  terrorism  and  serious  organised  crime  as  well  as  possible  response  strategies. 
EUSECON corroborated the view that economic grievances and discrimination patterns in 
specific sub sections of the labour market are likely to be relevant in this regard. However, 
instability,  crime  or  terrorism  are  also  likely  to  increase  as  underdeveloped  societies 29 
modernise and grow. This means that policies to address ‘causes’ of terrorism have to be 
pursued over the long term, and that instabilities may have to be endured before stability and 
security can take hold. At the same time, policy makers also have to consider more short term 
priorities. Terrorist campaigns of “medium” intensity pose the greatest challenge and may 
lead to significant political concessions, whereas terrorist campaigns of the highest intensity 
(repeated mass casualty bombings) are likely to alienate the terrorists’ support base. Similarly, 
counter piracy  (and organised crime) policies should be targeted on  areas that  experience 
significant  deficits  in     but  not  a  complete  absence  of     governance,  which  provides  the 
necessary context of profitable illicit activities.  
 
The second part of the paper provided a detailed estimation of the direct and indirect, as well 
as the short term  and long term costs of terrorism.  It was shown that  markets are highly 
sensitive to terrorist shocks, but that aggregate economic costs remain comparatively limited 
in mature markets. The long term indirect effects of terrorism and growth on terrorism have 
been  small.  EUSECON  even  showed  how  security  crises  can  generate  new  business 
opportunities, so that policy makers could take confidence in the ability of entrepreneurs in 
the face of adversity. Similarly, public opinion and voting patterns display considerable shifts 
in  relation  to  terrorist  attacks.  Yet  in  contrary  to  qualitative  studies  about  political 
development in the US over the last decade, EUSECON also showed that this effect has 
dissipated  relatively  quickly  in  European  member  states,  and  that  competing  concerns  of 
voters, such as about unemployment, remain significant.  
 
Overall, these findings supported a preference for restrained policy strategies that reflect the 
considerable resilience of society and markets. This does not resolve the political dilemmas 
that arise out of public pressure for a decisive response to each terrorist attacks, so that, over 
time,  security  measures  can  add  up  in  unforeseen  ways.  The  possible  dangers  of  such  a 
“ratchet effect” have also been documented in a more systematic manner by EUSECON. Both 
the  US  and  European  countries  experienced  an  erosion  of  civil  rights  and  human  rights 
provisions since 9/11, which could only be counteracted by increasing judicial control, i.e. by 
putting  a  break  on  (short term)  political  demands.  This  underlines  the  importance  of 
safeguarding core constitutional principles and non majoritarian considerations for security 
policy making.  
 30 
The last section of the paper explored in how far economic approaches could be drawn to 
evaluate  existing  policy  strategies  as  well  as  particular  instruments  in  the  fight  against 
terrorism and crime. Policy makers should take note of economic  reasoning on collective 
action problems when confronting transnational threats. This mainly concerns the risks of 
displacing rather than reducing the threat by uncoordinated national policies. Yet EUSECON 
research also showed that the cost effectiveness of different counter terrorism and security 
policies remains elusive. The available evidence points to a highly circumscribed benefit of 
policies that are solely focused on terrorism. At this stage, the evaluation of specific security 
policies requires further academic research, but also political support for more consistent data 
gathering and openness to critical voices.  
 
On this basis, security economics should be able to devise more rigorous and well informed 
cost benefit calculations that could guide security strategies over the long term. But it also 
remains open to question whether serious crime and terrorism can be dealt with on the basis 
of a “calculable” risk management approach (Golany et al., 2009), or whether it requires a 
political approach that prioritises the principles of precaution and pre emption, which, in turn, 
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